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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
the payee executed a note which provided that the assignor should attend
to collections;" where the holder bank permitted the payee to advance an
additional loan upon the mortgage and to accept renewals after assignment
of the same without the maker's knowledge.12 Where a loan broker makes
a loan as payee and later assigns the note and mortgage, the assignor is
deemed the agent of the assignee; and the maker is not required to demand
a return of the instrument.' 3
The dissent in the instant case reasoned that no agency was shown
either expressly or by ratification, and that it could not be shown by custom
because the note was not returned and plaintiff did not charge the payment
against the account of the payee. Therefore, the minority felt a directed
verdict for plaintiff proper. 14 The Federal Reserve Bank and its member
banks are separate and distinct corporate entities, and no agency relation
exists between them except such as arises from contract.15 The dissenting
judge relied on the Gettleman case which held that the return of prior
notes by the Federal Reserve Bank was merely indicative of the Bank's
acquiescence in payment of the notes and did not create a general agency.' 6
In the instant case, however, the note was not returned; and the Federal
Reserve Bank did not charge payment against the account of the Atlantic
City Bank. 1'
Although the majority view may be the more equitable under the facts
presented, the dissent seems to rest on a sounder general foundation. The
former appears to represent an application of the "two innocent parties"
maxim, whereas the latter tends to favor the negotiability of commercial
paper.
L. M. B.
BURGLARY AND LARCENY-FEIGNED ACCOMPLICE-PARTCIpATioN IN OVERT
ACT AS BASIS OF CoNVITIN-[Colorado]i.-To detect one who had boasted
of prior crimes, defendant, not an officer, encouraged him in a scheme for
11. Sherrill v. Cole (1930) 144 Okla. 301, 291 Pac. 54.
12. Stock Yards Nat. Bank v. Neugebauer (1935) 97 Colo. 246, 48 P.
(2d) 813.
13. James v. Conklin & Hill (1911) 158 Ill. App. 640; May v. Jarvis-
Conklin Mortgage & Trust Co. (1897) 138 Mo. 275, 39 S. W. 782; Pfeiffer
v. Heyes (1932) 166 Wash. 125, 131, 6 P. (2d) 612, 614. The court quoted
from Delaney v. Nelson (1925) 132 Wash. 472, 477, 232 Pac. 292: "In this
day of complicated commercial affairs we know that many duly authorized
agents have power to collect for others, although they have not possession
of the note or instrument upon which the collection is made. The authority
to make collection is dependent upon all of the surrounding circumstances
and the acts of the parties, and not alone upon the possession by the sup-
posed agent of the note or other instrument upon which payments are being
made." Contra, Interstate National Bank v. Koster (1930) 131 Kan. 461,
292 Pac. 805.
14. Federal Reserve Bank v. Algar (C. C. A. 3, 1939) 100 F. (2d) 941.
15. Federal Reserve Bank v. Gettleman (1937) 117 N. J. L. 416, 189
At. 86.
16. Ibid.
17. Federal Reserve Bank v. Algar (C. C. A. 3, 1939) 100 F. (2d) 941.
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burglary, helped him through the transom of a drug-store, and called police.
The trial court ruled that the defendant, having actually participated in
the crime, was guilty of aiding and abetting. Held, that the question of
criminal intent with which the assistance was given by the decoy should have
been submitted to the jury.1
In the few cases involving indictment of a detective, decoy, or informant,
courts in England2 and the United States have uniformly declared that
evidence of criminal intent was lacking to sustain conviction. The Missouri
Supreme Court, reversing the conviction of a detective for gambling, said,
"On the facts above stated * * * defendant ought not to have been con-
victed; there was clearly no criminal intent."3 In Piice v. People,' the de-
fendant warned an officer before proceeding into robbery and gave com-
plete information after the crime. This was held admissible as bearing on
intent. Where a saloon-keeper warned an officer of a contemplated robbery
and, on the latter's advice, lent a gun with which the robbery was committed,
an Ohio court, as in the instant case, reversed the decision because the
charge omitted the element of criminal intent.5
The question of the degree to which a feigned decoy may participate
without becoming an accomplice has arisen most frequently in cases in-
1. Wilson v. People (Colo. 1939) 87 P. (2d) 5.
2. Rex v. Dannelly (1816) 168 Eng. Rep. 818.
3. State v. Torphy (1899) 78 Mo. App. 206.
4. (1884) 109 II. 109.
5. Backenstoe v. State (1900) 19 Ohio Cir. Ct. 568, 10 Ohio Cir. Dec.
688.
6. Gambling: Commonwealth v. Baker (1892) 155 Mass. 287, 29 N. E.
512; State v. Lee (1910) 228 Mo. 480, 128 S. W. 987; People v. Noelke (Sup.
Ct. N. Y. 1883) 29 Hun. 461. Liquor offenses: Rose v. United States (C. C.
A. 6, 1921) 274 Fed. 245, cert. denied (1921) 257 U. S. 655; Commonwealth
v. Graves (1867) 97 Mass. 114; State v. Kimmell (1911) 156 Mo. App. 461,
137 S. W. 329; Farley v. Bronx Bath & Hotel Co. (1914) 163'App. Div. 459,
148 N. Y. S. 579; Ausbrook v. State (1913) 70 Tex. Cr. Rep. 289, 156 S. W.
1177; but see Smith v. State (1923) 93 Te. Cr. Rep. 529, 248 S. W. 685.
Lett v. United States (C. C. A. 8, 1926) 15 F. (2d) 690 (morphine);
United States v. Becker (C. C. A. 2, 1933) 62 F. (2d) 1007 (obscene matter
in the mails): People v. Swift (S. Ct. 1936) 161 Misc. 851, 293 N. Y. S. 378(prostitution *and procuring); People v. Bennett (1918) 182 App. Div. 871,
170 N. Y. S. 718, 36 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 408 (bribery); People v. Barric (1874)
49 Cal. 342 (receiving stolen property); Commonwealth v. Earl (1927) 91
Pa. Super. 447 (robbery, larceny, and theft); Sanchez v. State (1905) 48
Tex. Cr. Rep. 591, 90 S. W. 641 (robbery, larceny, and theft); Spencer v.
State (1907) 52 Tex. Cr. Rep. 289, 106 S. W. 386 (assault with intent to
kill); People v. Farrell (1866) 30 Cal. 316 (counterfeit coin); People v.
Keseling (1917) 35 Cal. App. 501, 170 Pac. 627 (practicing dentistry with-
out a license).
On intent as a matter for the jury see the following: Elliot v. State(1922) 92 Tex. Cr. Rep. 571, 244 S. W. 1007 (liquor offense); People v.
Spaulding (1927) 81 Cal. App. 615, 254 Pac. 614 (infamous crime); State
v. McKean (1873) 33 Iowa 343, 14 Am. Rep. 530; Jarrott v. State (1927)
108 Tex. Cr. Rep. 427, 1 S. W. (2d) 619.
7. Rose v. United States (C. C. A. 6, 1921) 274 Fed. 245, cert. denied(1921) 257 U. S. 655; Jarrott v. State (1927) 108 Tex. Cr. Rep. 427, 1
S. W. (2d) 619.
8. People v. Emmons (1908) 7 Cal. App. 685, 95 Pac. 1032.
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volving the competency of his testimony. Quite commonly, appellate courts
sustain the rulings of the trial judge charging or refusing to charge on
the issue of the decoy's being an accomplice under the facts presented, and
uphold verdicts based upon the conclusion that he was not.6 Whether the
feigned accomplice possesses a public or official status is immaterial.7 How-
ever, it has been said that no criminal intent is imputable even though public
authorities are not consulted.8
On the other hand, where a private detective induced a larceny, the in-
tent to deprive the owner temporarily of possession in order to secure a
reward was sufficient for conviction.9 It has been held that the testimony of
a prosecuting attorney, who contrived to be bribed so as to entrap the
offeror of the bribe, was that of an accomplice.10 In Dever v. State ' and
State v. Broumlee,' 2 the informant witness was characterized an accomplice
though the initial proposition looking to the offense came from the accused.
Both have since been distinguished, the Dever case because 3 the ruling of
complicity applied the test of intent,' 4 while the statement in the Brownlee
case has been declared dictum.'5 In a number of cases, participation of the
feigned accomplice in the crime, while not held criminal, has nevertheless
provoked severe judicial criticism.16
The instant case, in emphasizing the element of intent of one who pleads
the defense of deception, seems to accord with the prevailing opinion.'7
Criminal responsibility does not attach to participation without criminal
intent. V.K.
CONYLIcTS-FoREIGN CORPoRATIONS---"'DOING BUsINESS" FOR PURPosEs OF
Pwocss--[Federal].-A foreign corporation having no property, place of
business, or agent in Minnesota received orders from plaintiff company by
mail, telephone, or telegraph at its Washington, D. C. office. Service of sum-
9. Slaughter v. State (1901) 113 Ga. 284, 38 S. E. 854, 84 Am. St. Rep.
242.
10. Davis v. State (1913) 70 Tex. Cr. Rep. 524, 158 S. W. 288. See also
Sterling v. State (1923) 93 Tex. Cr. Rep. 527, 248 S. W. 684.
11. (1895) 37 Tex. Cr. Rep. 396, 30 S. W. 1071.
12. (1892) 84 Iowa 473, 51 N. W. 25.
13. Holmes v. State (1913) 70 Tex. Cr. Rep. 214, 156 S. W. 1172.
14. Slaughter v. State (1901) 113 Ga. 284, 38 S. E. 854, 84 Am. St. Rep.
242, cited supra, note 9.
15. Backenstoe v. State (1900) 19 Ohio Cir. Ct. 568, 10 Ohio Cir. Dec.
688
16. Connor v. People (1893) 18 Colo. 373, 33 Pac. 159, 25 L. R. A. 341,
36 Am. St. Rep. 295; United States v. Whittier (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1878)
Fed. Cas. No. 16,688; Saunder v. People (1878) 38 Mich. 218.
17. Of the above cases see especially: People v. Keseling (1917) 35 Cal.
App. 501, 170 Pac. 627; State v. McKean (1873) 62 Iowa 343, 14 Am.
Rep. 530; People v. Swift (S. Ct. 1936) 161 Misc. 851, 293 N. Y. S. 378;
Commonwealth v. Earl (1927) 91 Pa. Super. 447; Ausbrook v. State (1913)
70 Tex. Cr. Rep. 289, 156 S. W. 1177. See also Talmadge v. State (1922)
91 Tex. Cr. Rep. 177, 237 S. W. 568 (sheriff assisting in larceny not an
accomplice).
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